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A Philosophical Bestiary
Joseph Margolis
1 When Hilary Putnam asked, “Was Wittgenstein a pragmatist?” he admitted straight out
that the title of his lecture was “misleading, for I will [he explained] be talking as much or
more about the relation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to Kant’s as about its relation to,
say, William James’s.” He meant, he says, that he could have titled it just as aptly, “Was
Wittgenstein a Neo-Kantian?”1 Of course. Although the added clue was meant to be as
inexplicit  as  the question,  a  warning of  sorts  about  an unmarked danger,  a  piece of
induction. The fact is, Putnam viewed Wittgenstein’s “later philosophy” as “paralleling
certain themes in Pragmatism” and signaled that he regarded the resemblance as being
important to the direction (very probably, the redirection) of current philosophy.2 He
ventured a hint he knew would be widely construed as favoring a traditional or
conservative  treatment  of  the  future  of  pragmatism  and  analytic  philosophy  (and
philosophy at large) by remarking at once, within his triangulation, his intention “to
combat  the  prevalent  idea  that  Wittgenstein  is  simply  an  ‘end  of  philosophy’
philosopher.”3 He draws a similar lesson from his remarks on Kant. He means to restore a
proper sense of his own relationship to Wittgenstein and the classic pragmatists – to John
Dewey, preeminently – in order to provide (against a skeptic’s misreading of philosophy
in  the  large)  a  corrected  sense  of  how  the  kinship  between  Wittgenstein  and  the
pragmatists helps to secure our own bearings under a widening threat.
2 There can be no doubt that,  here,  Putnam is  combating what he regards as  Richard
Rorty’s picture of Wittgenstein – hence, then, Rorty’s pragmatism as well. But to concede
the complexity of that admission is, as we shall see, to enter into the rollercoaster inquiry
of where pragmatism may now be headed. In my reading, twenty years later, that’s to
conjure not only with Rorty, Putnam, and Wittgenstein – and Kant (and James and Dewey
and Peirce,  on Putnam’s  view)  –  but  also  with Wilfrid  Sellars,  Gottlob Frege,  Robert
Brandom, and (I would add) Huw Price, who have not, until recently, been counted as the
nearly  indispensible  (not  entirely  reliable)  pragmatist  players  they  have  become  in
current disputes about pragmatism’s fortunes. I take the inclusion of figures Putnam does
not  mention to help define an expanding agon that  cannot  be confined to Putnam’s
original confrontation with Rorty. Brandom, for instance, is not a Rortyan skeptic, though
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his own ‘recovery’ of pragmatism is itself a response to Rorty’s provocation. The sense of
Putnam’s question has become more diffuse, but also more compelling.
3 I’m  unwilling  to  say  that  any  of  the  last  group  mentioned  affords  an  acceptable
instruction as to pragmatism’s prospects: I don’t think any of them actually does. But the
best advice, bearing in mind the sense of Putnam’s question, arises from engaging their
challenges, just as,  close to forty years ago, the best sense of pragmatism’s resources
arose quite naturally from the minor distraction of that dead end of a dispute between
Rorty and Putnam that brought the last decades of the last century to a surprising close –
without Rorty or Putnam being responsible for any forceful revision of pragmatism’s
future.
4 Putnam’s  question  is  an  important  one,  though  Putnam  himself  is  drawn  to  an
unpromising distraction. Certainly, neither Rorty nor Kant nor James can be expected to
adjust our philosophical compass now in any fresh way; and though Wittgenstein remains
remarkably rewarding, Putnam’s own clue regarding Wittgenstein’s innovation is more
than coy. Brandom’s challenge is finally more important than Rorty’s, but it too threatens
to be a very large distraction in favor of an entirely subsidiary adjustment – within the
boundaries  of  formal  semantics  (however  notionally  applied  to  natural-language
discourse). Nevertheless, I’m convinced that we shall find ourselves on firmer ground, as
pragmatists, focused on the movement’s best prospects (from here on out), if we can get
clear about why it is that the philosophical turn Brandom pursues among his closest
discussants is, finally, a deflection from the main topics that should confront us.
5 The question about Wittgenstein draws us to an important clue that cannot (I surmise) be
adequately  examined  solely  in  accord  with  Wittgenstein’s  own  strategies.  Ironically,
Brandom’s  misreading  of  Wittgenstein  returns  us  (quite  unintentionally)  to  a  more
promising venture: namely, to the reconciliation of pragmatism and naturalism on the
strength  of  new  priorities,  the  defeat  of  newer  versions  of  deflationism  that  have
replaced  the  failed  energies  of  Rorty’s  “postmodern”  pragmatism  and  those  of  the
impossible extremes of twentieth-century scientism, as well as the dawning sense of the
primacy of the resources of the human self, which begin to set decisive constraints on the
redefinition of a defensible naturalism committed to the actuality of the self’s powers.
Count all that the barest sketch of a brief in favor of a new beginning – hardly captured
by the contest to be examined here. You cannot fail to see that the work of a figure like
Brandom  is  bound  to  play  a  not  insignificant  role  in  the  articulation  of  a  suitable
explanation of pragmatism in our time, to match the role Rorty and Putnam played in the
final decades of the last century. But I intend no invidious comparisons: the pertinent
contests of the two periods are very different indeed.
6 Rorty, of course, packaged Wittgenstein and Dewey together (and Heidegger, let us not
forget)  as  ‘postmodern’  pragmatists  of  his  own  persuasion.  All  that’s  gone  by  now;
nevertheless, part of the dismissive intent of Rorty’s ‘pragmatism’ has morphed into the
revival of the deflationary and minimalist proposals of more recent, more eccentric, self-
styled pragmatists in pursuit of their own often extreme economies along the lines of
certain forms of naturalism (as in the work of the Australian philosopher, Huw Price,
actively engaged in debate with Brandom) and, of course, of inferentialism (in Brandom’s
own vigorous proposals).
7 It’s my conviction that,  partly because of its remarkable revival,  pragmatism is being
drawn, separately, into close dialogue with certain temptingly spare forms of analytic
philosophy and other temptingly florid forms of settled continental philosophy. On the
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analytic side, it should be clear that it will be useful to revisit with care the question what
might now be the best way to integrate the often divisive concerns of pragmatism and
naturalism and, as a direct consequence, the unexpected revival of the distinctly remote
projects  of  formal  semantics,  now  somehow  reconciled  with  pragmatism  itself.  I’m
persuaded that these confrontations should serve in shaping a better answer to Putnam’s
question about Wittgenstein: partly because Wittgenstein (early and late) is so engaging
to Fregeans and Deweyans alike, as he is to discussants like myself who are drawn to the
need to neutralize the self-impoverishing ‘disenchantment’  so much in vogue in late
scientistic philosophies.
8 Price and Brandom share these themes – as,  indeed, did Rorty and Putnam in rather
different ways. Brandom strikes me as the natural stalking horse for our present purpose:
he is certainly more than Rorty’s principal student, undoubtedly the most unorthodox
self-styled pragmatist of the movement’s recent history, without a doubt the single most
visible,  skillful  proponent  of  a  radically  reoriented  (still  incompletely  articulated)
‘pragmatism’ for our day, engaged with all the themes I’ve mentioned (and more); and, I
should add, author of an unavoidable challenge as to how philosophy might now best
proceed. (I press this advice without prejudice as to what may prove to be the ultimate
verdict on Brandom’s bold gamble: that is, I urge it opportunistically.)
9 I happen to think that Price and Brandom have gone astray in certain decisive ways that
need to be addressed and ‘corrected’ in the interest of ensuring a continually tenable,
hopefully up-to-date and adequately informed pragmatism. I take the charge to usher in a
decidedly useful way of meeting Putnam’s question. It should come to rest in due course
in the implicit confrontation between Brandom and Wittgenstein. In any event, that is to
be the highlight of my own reading of Putnam’s question: because I mean to review the
newer challenges of naturalism and deflationism, which, by their own instruction, should
bring us to the decisive contest between the ‘pragmatism’ of the Investigations and that of
Between Saying and Doing. I trust it will be clear that the larger purpose of the exercise is to
assess pragmatism’s best prospects currently, in meeting the gathering challenges of the
day.
10 It will take a bit of patience to mark the argument’s trail convincingly. (I must give notice
here that I will not reach all of my intended targets in this single paper.) The inquiry
itself falls very naturally into two parts: the preparatory challenges of naturalism and
deflationism,  which,  apart  from  inferentialism,  are  Brandom’s  principal  sources  for
generating alternative options of genuine interest. In that spirit,  the first part of the
argument  – at  least  the  part  being  sketched  here  –  makes  its  contribution  without
fulfilling the essential promise of the second part – or the third. They’ll take their turn in
due course. But in widening the scope of Putnam’s question the issue demands a freer
canvass of the entire sweep of contemporary philosophy. 
11 Rorty, I  note,  is unfailingly explicit in the Introduction to Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature. He takes the “three most important philosophers [and pragmatists] of our century
–Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey – [to have] broke[n] free of the Kantian conception
of philosophy as foundational”:
The aim of [this] book [Rorty says] is to undermine the reader’s confidence in “the
mind”  as  something  about  which  there  ought  to  be  a  “theory”  and  which  has
“foundations,” and in “philosophy” as it has been conceived since Kant.4 
12 Putnam condemns the pragmatism Rorty constructs in his “picture of language speakers
as  automata,  ‘as’  deeply  un-Wittgensteinian.”5 On  that  reading,  Putnam  is  entirely
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justified. But I doubt it’s an accurate reading of what Rorty says. I must admit, somewhat
against Putnam, that I’m persuaded that when Rorty compares discursive ‘criteria’ with
‘programs’ and speaks of ‘language games’ as “governed by what he calls ‘algorithms’ or
‘programs’,” he may be signaling, very distantly (and misleadingly), no more than his
endorsement  of  some  early  version  of  Brandom’s  inferentialism  (well  before  the
publication of Between Saying and Doing),  rather than an endorsement of the apparent
automatism Putnam claims to find in Rorty’s pertinent texts. Though I thoroughly agree
that Rorty offers no compelling case for the ‘postmodern’ pragmatism of The Mirror of
Nature that I’ve barely sampled; it’s also reasonably clear that, in rejecting the Cartesian
theory of mind, Rorty does indeed endorse the larger doctrine, to the effect that “the
wholehearted behaviorism, naturalism, and physicalism I [Rorty] have been commending
[…]  help  us  avoid  the  self-deception  of  thinking  that  we  possess  a  deep,  hidden,
metaphysically significant nature which makes us ‘irreducibly’ different from inkwells or
atoms.”6 Imagine!
13 I say this cannot count as a fresh strain of pragmatism, if it ever did. Which, of course,
would require a proper grounding if  we were tempted to impose new constraints on
pragmatism,  naturalism,  realism,  deflationism,  the  relationship  between semantic
analyses and metaphysics, and the like. At the very least, then, against Rorty; it may be
entirely reasonable to support both a ‘folk’ account of the self’s career and whatever in
the way of the leanest possible materialism the physical sciences may be deemed able to
produce. In that event, such ‘pictures’ may be said to ‘model’ rather than to ‘map’ reality.
I see in this a perfectly plausible warning against the excessive claims of a deflationary
naturalism (Rorty’s and Price’s, both). There’s a blind spot in Rorty’s verdict that will
surface in a new guise (much later), in Brandom’s formalist rendering of inferentialism.
14 Rorty has a penchant for introducing preposterous specimens of what otherwise appear
to be entirely valid forms of philosophical hypothesis, and then dismissing at a stroke the
entire encompassing enterprise as impossible to redeem. Where’s the argument? None of
Rorty’s ‘most important philosophers’ follows him in going over the philosophical cliff.
But you must see that, increasingly, we are being threatened by a glut of indefensible or
unrewarding pragmatisms.’
15 I venture to say, in the way of a preliminary caution, that pragmatism acknowledges (i)
the robust functionality, the realist status, of what, unproblematically, we call the human
self or person (subject or agent), without insisting that the self must be construed as a
determinate  ‘substance’  of  this  or  that  kind or  as  possessing an essential  nature,  or
anything of the sort. (I take this to be close to Dewey’s view, in Experience and Nature.)
There  may  indeed  be  strongly  ‘deflationary’  views  of  the  functioning  of  the  self  –
somewhat akin to the sense in which there are promising deflationary accounts of ‘truth’
– that cannot be ignored. But as matters now stand (and for the forseeable future), it
makes no sense to speak of the achievements of the sciences without admitting some
‘strong’  sense of truth on which an admittedly subordinate deflationary proposal may
afford  a  useful  economy.  In  much  the  same  sense,  I  argue  that  there  can  be  no
achievement of the kind we name “science” unless there are also actual agents of inquiry
who can be credited with the feats that need to be explained. I should say at once that I
mean to return to the improbably strategic importance of the analysis of truth to the
future prospects of pragmatism – and the whole of the Eurocentric tradition. The point of
the linkage, I dare say, is not yet clear. Let me suggest, for the moment, that the entire
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inquiry centers on the conceptual relationship between pragmatism and naturalism and
what that contested topic brings into view.
16 To return to the tally I’ve just begun, the upshot of item (i) at once yields, as item (ii), the
additional thought that realism (in the pragmatist sense) is bound to be constructivist but
not subjectivist (say, in the classic empiricist or Kantian – ‘idealist’ – manner), ‘pluralist’
(as  it  is  now often said  to  be,  to  avoid pretensions  of  privilege  of  any sort);  hence,
indissolubly  linked to  one or  another  acceptably  conjectured (post-Kantian)  ‘Idealist’
picture of the real world (‘Idealist’ with a capital ‘I’: meaning that it is not at all a merely
psychological  doctrine),  which (in the manner of  Peirce or  Cassirer  or,  with charity,
Hegel) is what I mean by an ‘objective’ constructivism that avoids all claims of actually
constructing the natural world that we say our science knows.7 
17 If so, then (I dare continue), (iii) pragmatism is bound to treat all distinctions between the
‘subject-ive’ and the ‘object-ive,’ pertinent to the resolution of standard epistemological
and metaphysical questions (of the sort Rorty rejects unconditionally), as matters entirely
internal  to  one  or  another  realist  (or  realist/Idealist)  space  of  inquiry,  indissolubly
posited in the sense just broached in item (ii) of the tally that’s now unfolding. (I expect
you realize that my tally is entirely programmatic.) All that I can say, for the moment, in
its  favor  is,  as  I’ve  hinted,  that  the salient  weaknesses  of  the so-called “pragmatist”
ventures of figures like Brandom, Price, and Sellars inadvertently instruct us in the need
to fashion a more robust alternative to collect pragmatism’s best prospects.
18 I now add item (iv) to our tally, namely, that in keeping with pragmatism’s avoidance of
all  presumptions  of  privilege  and  contrived  or  arbitrary  disjunctions  that  might
otherwise yield unearned (and unwanted) advantages in resolving cognitive questions, all
valid attributions of a cognitively qualified sort are, paradigmatically (or, if preferred,
derivatively), ascribed to the nature and agency of functionally apt selves; that is, that, on
the thesis that the analysis of language (or meaning) and the analysis of the world we
claim to know are indissolubly intertwined – the known world being ‘enlanguaged’ and
natural  language,  ‘enworlded’  –  the  analysis  of  language,  world,  and  knowledge  is
insuperably  conjectural,  penetrated  by  human  interests,  holistically  indissoluble  and
determinably realist in its outlook, in accord once again with item (ii). Coordinately, I
think we must also postulate, as item (v), the idea that, qua agent, the self is – wherever
speaking, thinking, acting, reflecting, and the like are affirmed – the nominal site of all
such acknowledged powers, holistically engaged, uniquely emergent under conditions of
biological and cultural evolution and enlanguaged Bildung, capable (in maturity) of being
reflexively experienced (though not sensorily), entitled to realist standing in whatever
respect  and degree is  accorded the “things” of  the world we deem accessible to the
sciences and practical inquiry. 
19 I dare venture two further premises easily accepted by any viable, reasonably standard
form of pragmatism: (vi) that the career of a living self is itself history or a history, or
historied; that is, selves are reflexively aware that their conceptual, perceptual, affective,
agentive, and related powers are informed and affected by historical changes as a result
of having mastered (internalized) the language and culture of the society in which they
first emerge and subsequently live; and (vii) that the description and explanation of all
the powers of the self and the processes and attributes of the world the self inhabits,
comes to know, manipulates, understands, or affects, may, it is supposed, be cast entirely
in  naturalistic  terms,  though any  viable  naturalism must,  accordingly,  accommodate
whatever among the self’s first-personal powers prove to be resistant to any dismissive
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form of deflation or reduction or elimination. I’m touching here on some of the dawning
contests  on which the fortunes of  pragmatism and the whole of  Western philosophy
depend:  in  particular,  those  that  mark  the  importance  of  the  distinctive  (but  not
especially orderly) confrontation with figures like Brandom, Price,  Sellars,  Rorty,  and
Wittgenstein. 
20 Once you have a schema of this scope and plausibility in hand, you see at once how easy it
is to detect deflections from, deformations and abandonments of, presumptions beyond,
the  modest  demands  of  classic  pragmatism.  So,  for  example,  the  daring  of  Rorty’s
‘postmodern’ pragmatism cannot possibly be an admissible form of pragmatism if we
yield in the direction of  the tally I’ve just  contrived.  Similarly but for very different
reasons,  everything  remotely  in  accord  with  Kant’s  transcendentalism  (but  not  the
‘transcendental’ question itself) cannot possibly pass muster. But then, Putnam’s ‘internal
realism’ – which Putnam himself acknowledges founders on its adopting an empiricist
form of representationalism (very possibly misled by James) – cannot be defended (as a
viable form of pragmatism) any more than the thesis that worried Kant in his famous
letter to Marcus Herz.8 Nevertheless, ‘representationalism’ in any benignly Hegelianized
(‘presuppositionless’)  form  of  phenomenological  ‘presentationalism’  (as  in  Peirce’s
variant) may actually be needed to offset, convincingly, every illicit form of perceptual or
cognate privilege. 
21 It may not seem so, but I am indeed responding to Putnam’s question. I take Putnam to be
asking: “If Rorty calls himself a pragmatist, then can we reasonably call Wittgenstein a
pragmatist?” The question has to do with pragmatism’s future. So that now that Brandom
has actually formulated his picture of the pragmatist promise of his own inferentialism –
what he calls ‘analytic pragmatism’ – we begin to recognize an entirely fresh attempt to
subsume or adjust pragmatism’s classic intuitions under auspices that threaten to drown
out  or  effectively  marginalize  what  are  pragmatism’s  best  insights  vis-à-vis the  most
important and likeliest contests of our day. 
22 In this sense, the answer to Putnam’s question is, quite simply, No! Wittgenstein is not a
pragmatist in any instructive sense; Rorty is, finally, a pragmatist only in the comic sense
in  which  any  large  doctrine  may  be  completely  disorganized  by  turning  its  own
commitments against its ‘truer self’; and Brandom may be counted a pragmatist chiefly, I
would say, on the basis of equivocating between the ‘pragmatic’ commitments of any
standard version of philosophical pragmatism and the so-called “pragmatic” features of
the semantic analysis of discourse directed at making explicit the inferential implications
of  what  we  do by  way  of  verbal  and  nonverbal  behavior,  that  may  be  expressed
(functionally or ‘logically’) in terms of what we ‘say’ (or may say) ‘expresses’ the implicit
inferential  import of  what we actually ‘do’;  and partly on the strength of  Brandom’s
affection  for  the  ‘pragmatism’  of  figures  as  diverse  as  Rorty,  Dewey,  Sellars,  Frege,
Wittgenstein, Davidson, Heidegger and others labeled by Rorty (at one time or another) as
pragmatists. The moniker hardly matters, but the confusion that results is hardly helpful.
Pragmatism faces a remarkably open opportunity to strengthen its various undertakings
in our own time. I would hate to see it squandered in the newly refurbished quarrels now
intriguingly resurrected from the past. 
23 Here, if I understand Brandom correctly – I’m not sure I do understand him, I’m not sure
Brandom’s  introductory  remarks  about  the  inferentialist  program  he  introduces,  in
Between Saying and Doing,  are entirely transparent – I  would be willing to say that we
could, without the least disadvantage, construe our pragmatist reading of the functional
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use of  any  so-called  ‘target’  vocabulary  (in  terms  of  any  so-called  ‘base’  vocabulary
favored for the inferentialist game) as either ‘representational’ or ‘expressive.’ We would,
of course, have to admit some sort of benign ‘privilege’ at least two foci in either sort of
account:  in the sense,  first,  that something meaningful  would have had to be ‘given’
(presuppositionlessly) in the target vocabulary, which we would wish to preserve in our
explication; and, second, that the explication itself would, thus far at least, adequately
preserve the ‘meaning’ thus given. Alternatively put, any deflationary or reductionist or
similar  search  for  would-be  ‘semantic’  economies  would  have  to  be  independently
defended.9 There is no a priori reason why a representational theory of language or an
epistemologically qualified theory of truth must be unacceptable within the terms of the
leanest form of naturalism adequate to pragmatism’s needs. But I don’t deny that that’s a
quarrelsome claim. 
24 Brandom introduces his own undertaking as follows: 
What I want to call the “classical project of analysis” [formal semantics, or, more
narrowly,  what  Brandom  names  “semantic  logicism”]  […]  aims  to  exhibit  the
meanings expressed by various target vocabularies as intelligible by means of the
logical elaboration of the meanings expressed by base vocabularies thought to be
privileged in some important respects – epistemological, ontological, or semantic –
relative to these others. 
25 This Brandom calls ‘the core program’; the famous ‘extension’ he wishes to add (to round
matters out) – that is, the rules of inferentialism – comes from ‘the pragmatist challenge’
(he says) he associates chiefly (always by way of Wilfrid Sellars’s very different labors)
with Wittgenstein’s distinction between ‘meaning’ and ‘use,’ which Brandom regards as
the nerve of ‘Wittgensteinian pragmatism.’10 So he means to answer Putnam’s question as
well!
26 You see, of course, if you allow the liberty, that it no longer matters whether we prefer to
speak in  the  idiom of  ‘representation’  or  that  of  ‘expression’  (which both Price  and
Brandom worry in terms of deflationist preferences of different degrees of daring): we
can invoke either notion at any point in the same exercise (or both together); each (we
suppose)  addresses  the  substantive  aspect  of  discourse  that  we  would  not  want  any
strictly deflationary or deflationary naturalist  maneuver to displace.  Beyond all  that,
which must be examined more carefully, I see no reason to disallow Brandom’s attempt to
provide ‘a complete account of semantics’: the only questions that arise ask (benignly), Is
the program viable? Is it robust enough to be worth pursuing? Are there restricting or
disabling  complications  that  have  not  yet  been acknowledged?  Does  it  qualify  as  an
enlargement of pragmatism’s own program? Has Brandom read Wittgenstein correctly?
Sellars? Dewey? Frege? Or, indeed, Peirce?11 (We have only to resist the fatal conviction
that  deflationism  is  an  autonomous  semantic  discipline  that  overrides  any  “old-
fashioned” metaphysics).  Deflationism, I  say,  is  always an encumbered and dependent
philosophical strategy: it cannot completely disjoin semantic analysis and “metaphysics.”
12 
27 Curiously, Brandom reports Rorty’s actual response to drafts of his Locke lectures (now
collected as Between Saying and Doing), which reads as follows: “Why in the world would
you want to extend the death throes of analytic philosophy by another decade or two?”13
Rorty saw at  once,  you realize,  the retrograde possibilities  of  Brandom’s  innovation.
Imagine! Given Brandom’s response, it’s perfectly clear that the answer is in good part a
matter of philosophical taste. Nevertheless, Brandom’s answer does begin to explain the
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sense in which his venture is much more traditional and conservative than one might
have  supposed  –possibly  even  regressive  when  compared  with  Wittgenstein,  Dewey,
Rorty,  Putnam,  and  Sellars  –  despite  his  affirming  his  openness  to  ‘epistemological,
ontological, and semantic’ issues and his willingness to address the resources of ‘folk’
vocabularies. Rorty’s reaction is rather more puzzling, because Rorty surely knew what
Brandom was up to. (I can only think that Rorty’s remark was meant to be reported as a
comic putdown.)
28 Huw Price,  a rising Australian philosopher and an ally (and opponent) of  Brandom’s,
actually suggests that Brandom may be a ‘counter-revolutionary’ analyst or pragmatist or
‘analytic pragmatist.’14 The point at stake is that Brandom cannot be easily pinned down
as  to  where,  precisely,  he  stands  with  respect  to  the  conceptual  issues  his  own
inferentialism poses regarding topics like empiricism, naturalism (especially naturalism),
deflationism, traditional metaphysics, realism, minimalisms of various kinds, defensible
ways of speaking of subjects and objects, the relationship between epistemology,
ontology, and semantics and the like. It’s not clear at all that Brandom addresses theses
issues adequately (or as a committed pragmatist) – as when he lays out the largely formal
schema of the inferentialist program sketched in Between Saying and Doing. That is, from
the side of naturalism and realism, for instance, or from the side of semantic analysis
informed by same. There’s the question we must pursue if we are to answer Putnam’s
opening question perspicuously: to catch a glimpse of what new philosophical options
may  be  in  the  offing.  Brandom  is  surprisingly  guarded  about  committing  himself
‘metaphysically,’  though  I  would  not  say  that  he  equivocates  there.  He  hasn’t  fully
resolved the question in his own mind!
29 In fact, the topics just mentioned, which are among the principal topics of the day, seem
overly familiar – as of course they are. But the novelty persists: What, finally, should we
regard  as  the  most  tenable  account  of  the  relationship  between  pragmatism  and
naturalism? Through the whole of the analytic tradition of the last century, the favored
answer  has  been  this:  that  pragmatism  must  yield to  the  scientistic  (or  reductive)
economies of naturalism. I venture to say that, now, it makes more sense to hold that
naturalism must concede the prior force and standing of the essential requirements of
pragmatism (if, that is, something close to the pragmatist themes I’ve tallied a short while
ago can be  reasonably  defended).  Naturalism is  a  variable  doctrine  subaltern to  our
adherence to some more fundamental claim: pragmatist or reductionist, for example. I
regard the change as a tribute to the rising importance of the theory of the self. Price, I
may say, takes an uncertain view of the primacy of the human subject: he clearly rejects
the ‘popular’ naturalistic thesis that holds that, in relevant contexts, “philosophy” must
yield to ‘science.’15 But I cannot see how he finally eludes its grasp; he does not explain
the proper scope of deflationism, which cannot fail to be a subaltern strategy. In a way, I
welcome Price’s insistence (his ‘Priority Thesis’) to the effect that “subject naturalism is
theoretically  prior  to  object  naturalism” (which stalemates  reductionism,  if  I  read it
aright);  but  that  does  not  quite  settle  the  relationship  between  naturalism  and
pragmatism.  There  must  be  suitable  (pragmatist)  constraints  on  deflationism,  if  the
Thesis is to be read, finally, along pragmatist lines.
30 In  effect,  the  required  shift  now  means  our  being  prepared  to  rebut  any  and  all
impoverishing  deflationary  economies  with  regard  to  metaphysics  and epistemology.
That  is,  if  we correctly  perceive  that  naturalism has  no privileged standing.  Indeed,
neither has pragmatism. Nevertheless, in different ways, the admission is compromised
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by both Price and Brandom. Brandom and Price have, then, begun to occupy the eccentric
successor roles of the opposition Putnam and Rorty originally shared at the end of the
twentieth century. Both of the new contenders are clearly caught up with a nostalgia for
the  scientistic:  Price  (influenced by  Simon Blackburn’s  ‘quasi-realism’)  perhaps  more
daringly  than  Brandom.  My  own  guess  has  it  that  the  freshest  and  most  engaging
moments of the developing contest, which ranges far beyond any merely local skirmish,
will  come to rest among the pros and cons (once again) of deflationary and counter-
deflationary treatments of truth and disputes regarding representationalism and realism
and the strategies of metaphilosophy. 
31 Now,  what  am  I  actually  offering  in  the  way  of  a  guess  at  pragmatism’s  changing
prospects? I’m persuaded that we’re approaching a new agon obliquely. The center of
gravity  will  be  the  consolidation  of  a  simplified,  greatly  strengthened.  An  enlarged
pragmatism and the leanest  possible form of  naturalism we can defend.  The current
forays that command attention are all at least partially retrograde. The best of these
favors  semantic  deflationisms  of  a  variably  reductionist  or  eliminativist  or  merely
extensionalist cast: most wildly in Rorty; traditionally and rather one-sidedly (thus far),
in Brandom; and possibly in the riskiest way, in the deflationary sense, in Price. I don’t
believe it’s  the power of  conceptual  invention that’s  decisive;  it’s  the provocation of
largely neglected or incompletely examined puzzles suddenly remembered because they
have been revived in a more confrontational and more insistent form than is usual.
32 What  I  surmise  has  happened is  that  a  new tension is  beginning to  make itself  felt
regarding the analysis of the human self or subject: that’s to say, regarding the most
essential topic of the entire movement we know as pragmatism. On the one hand, the
conjunction  of  deflationism  (as  with  the  semantics  of  truth  and  meaning)  and  the
continuing attraction of the supposed primacy and autonomy of semantic analysis (with
respect to marginalizing ‘traditional’ metaphysics and epistemology) threaten to recover
reductive  and  eliminativist  intentions  by  semantically  and  informationally  contrived
strategies; and, on the other hand, conceptual economies regarding the functionality of
the self (in science and morality, or in accord with the ‘natural artifactuality’ of language
and enlanguaged and encultured human life) are beginning to require a fresh assessment
of the sense in which the self remains a thoroughly natural kind of being. You realize,
therefore, that the more promising, newer constraints cut against the older scientistic
wave of naturalism – a fortiori, against the scientistic strains of deflationism. 
33 I admit I favor the anti-scientistic turn, particularly the enrichment of the theory of the
self, where it favors joining Hegelian and Darwinian themes. But these have not yet been
picked up with conviction by more recent inquiries –which, to my thinking, confirms the
continuing attraction of regressive impulses among analysts, pragmatists, and naturalists
alike. For similar reasons, there’s little that’s arresting in the way of novel treatments of
social,  cultural,  historical,  biological,  paleontological,  evolutionary,  normative,
communicative,  informational  phenomena  among  naturalists  and  pragmatists.  My
intuition  is  that  the  recovery  of  a  robust  conception  of  the  self  will  proceed  along
artifactualist  and constructivist  lines;  otherwise,  insistence  on a  merely  functionalist
treatment of the self is likely to retreat to the effective autonomy of semantic economies,
the minor exercise of testing the tolerable limits of a dependent deflationism, and the
inchoate reduction (or elimination) of the cultural and linguistic world in biochemical
and  neurophysiological  terms.  I  offer  in  evidence  the  amusing  but  otherwise
impoverished conclusion steadfastly championed by Daniel Dennett.16
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34 The  importance  of  Huw  Price’s  contribution  to  the  growing  dispute  regarding
pragmatism’s  future  lies  with  his  rather  daring  sense  of  naturalism’s  liens  on
pragmatism’s  options.  For  one  thing,  he’s  suspicious  of  philosophy’s ‘old-fashioned’
metaphysics and epistemology; he favors the authority and competence of ‘science’ (in
what degree, is not entirely clear) to determine all pertinent facts regarding what may be
found in the world. As he says, ”there is no framework-independent [extra-linguistic]
stance for metaphysics.”17 I agree. (But, surely, one must concede the inverse with regard
to semantic analyses as well.) Price also supports the following quite ingenious thesis,
which he calls ‘functional pluralism,’ the conception of which (if it entails no prejudice to
the standing of any substantive claim) I find entirely congenial:
A  functional  pluralist  accepts  that  moral,  modal,  and  meaning  utterances  are
descriptive, fact-stating, truth-apt, cognitive, belief-expressing, or whatever – and
full-bloodedly so,  not  merely in some ersatz or “quasi”  sense.  Nevertheless,  the
pluralist  insists  that  these  descriptive  utterances  are  functionally  distinct  from
scientific  descriptions of  the natural  world;  they do a different job in language.
They are descriptive, but their job is not to describe what science describes.18 
35 Pluralist strategies may be reconciled with naturalism, therefore, if we possess arguments
sufficient to make the case. For instance, I willingly concede that there are no ‘moral
norms’ to be found in the world as ‘actual’ or ‘real’ or ‘existent’ in any respect in which
human persons are found in the world. But, for one thing, I reserve the right of any
philosopher to attempt to make the contrary case. For a second, I would not deny that
humans have indeed constructed plausible forms of moral discourse that answer to their
interests and are capable of sustaining rational dispute and rational commitment firm
enough to vindicate their (that is, our) practice of speaking of moral truths and moral
facts. For a third, I would not support a similar claim against the actuality of words and
sentences or persons or families or artworks or money or political states or the like. And,
for a fourth, I see no plausible way of precluding the question of the naturalist standing of
selves across science and morality (or similar categorical demarcations).
36 Given such constraints,  I  would  argue  that  there  is  no  disjunctive  line  to  be  drawn
between science and philosophy (or metaphysics), or indeed between science and non-
science; and that, as a consequence, there are no compelling arguments to be had in favor
of the ‘primacy of science’ over (say) philosophy or art criticism or history – or,  any
privileged disjunction between semantic  analysis  and metaphysics.  Hence,  I  take  the
following  characterization  (by  Price)  of  the  “functional  pluralist’s”  position  to  be
seriously misguided or at least indefensible: 
functional pluralists […] speak from within the scientific framework, but about other
frameworks. This gives the scientific framework a kind of perspectival primacy. Our
viewpoint  is  internal  to  science,  but  external  to  morality,  for  example.  It  is  a
viewpoint  which  allows  us  to  refer  directly  to  the  objects  and  properties
countenanced by science, but not to the objects countenanced by the moral stance.
37 This spells out (very briefly) what Price means by his subscribing to what he names ‘the
Carnap Thesis’ (regarding ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions).19 But I cannot see that the
‘functional  pluralist’s’  demarcation  policy  has  any  plausible  payoff  regarding  the
relationship between pragmatism, naturalism, and deflationism, unless it’s to debar us
from posing essential questions. The philosophical standing of the self or person is simply
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too important to be settled by verbal devices: the self belongs, if it belongs anywhere, to
science and morality alike. (If so, then the ‘Priority Thesis’ is not well formed).
38 It’s on such grounds that Price comes to favor potentially privileged, often quite extreme
deflationary (or minimalist) strategies: for example, what he calls the ‘Priority Thesis,’
according  to  which  (broadly  conceived),  “if  the  claims  and  ambitions  of  philosophy
conflict with what science tells us about ourselves [and, it would seem, about the world
that science knows] then philosophy needs to give way.” Nevertheless, Price also notes
that science “cannot turn its spotlight on the language of science itself.”20 So there are
unresolved aporiai at  the very heart of Price’s naturalism; hence,  grounds for serious
objections affecting not merely his own proposals but all efforts to ensure the objective
standing  of  deflationary  and  minimalist  economies  ranging  over  all  ‘metaphysical,’
‘epistemological,’ and ‘semantic’ disputes. As Price concedes: “the contribution on our
side [regarding whatever counts as an objective picture of the real world] never goes to
zero.”21
39 I cannot see how these views can be coherently reconciled. But then, you glimpse, here,
the  sense  in  which  arguments  (by  Brandom  and  Price)  said  to  be  hospitable  to
pragmatism’s  future  prospects  instruct  us  (unwittingly)  about  what  is  closer  to
pragmatism’s  true  fortunes  among  the  contests  that  are  just  now  surfacing  along
potentially productive lines.22
40 I would say Brandom’s intuition was more promising than Price’s (but noticeably less
explicit), just where Price takes Brandom to be equivocating or to be actually inconsistent
–  in  the  spirit  of  Price’s  provocatively  deflationist  option  (barely  bruited  here).
Nevertheless,  Brandom’s  own  attraction  to  deflationism  (or  what  he  offers  as  its
‘prosentential’ analogue)23 all but wipes out the gain he nearly secures. Both Price and
Brandom seek roundabout formulations of  what,  without prejudice (or ‘metaphysical’
intent), we may as well call seeking truth – though in such a way that both Price and
Brandom manage to preclude the actual  use of  ‘true’  as  an ascribable predicate that
serves  (in  Brandom’s  deprecating  characterization)  as  explanatory ‘guarantor  of  the
success of our practical endeavors’24 – what I’ve dubbed ‘seeking truth’ solely to keep our
disputed goal in view. The only reliable objection to Brandom’s deflationary charge (but
the  objection  does  indeed  count)  is  that  ‘true’  fills  predicative  roles  that  are  not
committed  in  any  way  to  cognitive  privilege  (or,  for  that  matter,  to  ordinary
‘explanatory’ tasks). I am prepared to argue that every strong deflationary paraphrase of
‘true’ omits what we cannot afford to leave out, or circularly implicates what we claim to
have dismissed, or is tautologically uninstructive with regard to the elusive consideration
in question. I mean, of course, the realist import of the truth predicate. Recall that, on my
view, philosophical semantics is metaphysics in another guise. If I’m right about this, then
even the most effective and compelling deflationary treatment of ‘truth – surely,  the
treatment Paul Horwich accords it – signals its own ineluctable defect.
41 We’ve arrived, then, at an essential contrast,  a place at which to begin to decide the
respective fate and fortune of the deflationary/anti-deflationary treatments of ‘truth,’
‘represenationality,’ ‘reference,’ ‘evidence,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘reality,’ and the like, essential
(as I see matters) to deciding the right or best (or, perhaps better, ‘second-best’) way to
reconcile pragmatism and naturalism in our time. I take ‘truth’ to be the exemplary case,
and Price and Brandom to have failed us in the pragmatist’s quest. Effectively, there is a
function of the predicate ‘true’ that is inseparable from the epistemic function of ‘fact’ or
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‘confirmed fact’  (or  the like),  which deflationists  cannot  convincingly account  for  or
explain away semantically.
42 I can spare very little space here to specify the force of what I take to be the pragmatist
complaint, perhaps most clearly anticipated in Peirce’s paper, “The Fixation of Belief” –
but  surely  implicit  in  the  classic  pragmatists’  treatment  of  ‘truth’  (no  matter  how
tortured).  I  find the nerve of  the quarrel  adumbrated,  unintentionally,  in Brandom’s
chapter, titled “Why Truth is Not Important in Philosophy.” Consider, for instance, the
following lines:
I’ve said that my claim that truth is not important in philosophy should not be
understood  as  denying  the  importance  of  truthfulness,  epistemic
conscientiousness, or assessments of knowledge. But I’ve also said that in each of
these cases,  though we may if  we like talk about the phenomena in question in
terms of truth, we need not do so, and lose nothing essential if we do not.25 
43 This sounds reasonable but it is not: it falls far short of what a full-blooded pragmatism
would  (rightly)  require.  What  is  the  point  of  separating  ‘truth’  and  ‘epistemic
conscientiousness’ if truth is treated in the strongest deflationary way?
44 There remains a still-unanswered objection:  namely, that a would-be essential  use or
function of true’ (which Brandom and Price intend to displace or deflate in somewhat
different  ways)  cannot  be  secured by  any merely  psychological  or  semantic  element
(unless suitably linked to what is epistemologically still missing); hence, that the function
needed cannot be derived from any would-be prior inferential linkage between what we
say and what we do (according to Brandom’s strategy). I’m convinced that this single
challenge stalemates every merely deflationary account of ‘truth’ – hence, also, every
inferentialist  program  (of  Brandom’s  sort)  that  claims  to  be  full-service  (including
Brandom’s own variant).
45 I’m certain we can do better in reconciling pragmatism and naturalism, because there are
a  good  many  ‘methodologically  temperate’  factual  discoveries  about  the  advent  of
language, the functionalities of the emergent self, the nature of enlanguaged cultures
(drawn in part from post-Darwinian paleoanthropology) that are in noticeable accord
with  the  pragmatist’s  essential  commitments  (tallied  earlier)  –  where  pragmatism is
clearly not in accord with scientism – commitments Price tends to discount or ‘deflate’ if
he can,  preferring scientism’s seemingly more robust facts,  all  the while he presents
himself as a pragmatist (as in his seemingly robust ‘Priority Thesis’). 
46 Price’s executive commitment insists that the analysis of ‘representationalism’ and (say)
‘truth’ should be conducted from a vantage that “remain[s] resolutely on the ‘word’ side
of the word/world divide.”26 (A policy meant to hold for pragmatists and naturalists alike
– but is plainly nowhere secured.) Price is either arbitrary here or in tow to his own
unguarded metaphysics. I find the worry confirmed, however innocently, in Price’s so-
called ‘Priority Thesis,’  which I’ve mentioned in passing and which is  best  read as  a
deflationist’s version of pragmatism: 
Subject naturalism [Price says] is theoretically prior to object naturalism, because
the latter depends on validation from a subject naturalist perspective.27 
47 Certainly, this much of Price’s view may seem to accord with pragmatism’s priorities. But
the formulation is hardly perspicuous. We are not told how to distinguish between the
claims  of  science  and  the  claims  of  philosophy,  and  we  are  not  told  how  the
argumentative resources of the ‘two’ sorts of naturalism are to be shared or divided – or
indeed what ‘priority’ now means. We are hardly told what ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ are.
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48 By ‘object naturalism’ Price intends the doctrine, ontological or/and epistemological, that
holds that ‘all there is the world studied by science’ or/and that ‘all genuine knowledge is
scientific  knowledge.’  By  ‘subject  naturalism,’  however,  he  means,  eccentrically,  that
“science tells us that we humans are natural creatures, and if the claims of and ambitions
of philosophy conflict with this view, then philosophy needs to give way.” But surely that
means (may at least be construed as meaning) that ‘subject naturalism’ is itself subsumed
under the umbrella of ‘object naturalism’ (or is entitled to claim evidentiery resources
that are not yet spelled out), which sets the stage for an extensive deflationism – a fortiori,
for a deflationary version of pragmatism itself. It’s also possible that Price is committed
to inconsistent readings of his ‘subject naturalism’: on the one hand, subject naturalism is
addressed to a sub-topic of object naturalism and is subject,  therefore, to the latter’s
priorities: on the other hand, the whole of object naturalism presupposes the validative
‘priority’ of subject naturalism, so subject naturalism is characterized in some privileged
way.28 Beyond all that, Price explicitly says that he is committed to ‘naturalism without
representationalism’29 – which is, of course, the first salvo of a very strong deflationism
that cannot fail  to undermine the ‘normal’  priorities of a pragmatist’s reading of the
‘Priority Thesis.’  (Representationalism, like truth, is a profoundly equivocal notion, as
Kant discovered.) 
49 The  clue  I  spy  is  naive  enough.  For  one  thing,  I  agree  with  what  Price  calls  the
‘insubstantialist’ account of truth: namely, ‘that truth itself plays no significant causal-
explanatory role’ of its own.30 For a second, I have no doubt that what we mean by ‘truth’
(as well as what we mean by ‘knowledge’ and ‘reality’), within the context of any body of
science,  cannot be simply discovered,  must be a reasoned construction of  some kind
relative to human interests; hence, that to hold that semantic analysis is inseparable from
metaphysics (and epistemology) produces no paradox at all. Nevertheless, there is a third
consideration  to  conjure  with:  namely,  that  truth  concerns  a  distinctive  kind  of
relationship between (what is often called) the ‘assertoric’ use of language and whatever
belongs among the ‘things’ of the world that assertion and action engage (as by ‘saying
and doing’) – a relationship that, invoking our understanding of the nature of human
selves and their interests, supports an all but indefeasible, generic, realist conviction,
without indefeasible criteria or conceptions of any sort regarding meaning, knowledge,
reality, or the like. 
50 In this sense, I would not say, with Price, that truth is merely ‘insubstantialist’: it does
answer to our ‘substantialist’ sense of the actuality of our world; the uniqueness of our
discursive and reflexive powers ubiquitously involved in all our engagements with the
world; and, most important, our practical or effective inability (in what may be rightly
qualified as ‘pragmatic’ – in Peirce’s and Dewey’s convergent picture of the continuum of
the animal and the human) to ‘doubt’ or deny the realist import of our involvement with
the world. In short, for all our philosophical cleverness, we cannot (in the pragmatist
sense) shake free of our spontaneous, more or less ubiquitous commitment to the realist
cast of assertoric ‘success,’ which, of course, is hardly hostage to any particular truth-
claim.  Furthermore,  although there  are,  admittedly,  important  parallels  between the
functions of cognitive and moral norms and even between ‘realist’ beliefs regarding truth
and (may I say) beliefs of moral ‘correctness,’ the insuperable ‘persuasion’ of the first
cannot be matched by that of the second.
51 In this sense, ‘truth’ answers primordially to a presumptive realist relationship between
assertion and world, whereas moral ‘assertion’ at its most fundamental cannot claim to
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rest on a similarly irresistible presumption. I  take that to be a very strong abductive
intuition, impossible to confirm decisively.
52 Price may have been too quick, then, in denying Brandom a better option against his own
sort of minimalism. He cites Brandom’s words against Brandom’s unguarded tendency
toward metaphysical ‘inflation,’ hence, toward an old-fashioned, outmoded way of doing
metaphysics;  that  is,  he  signals  that  Brandom  is equivocally  attracted  to
representationalism all the while he (Brandom) assures us that he means to address such
matters  ‘semantically.’  But  I  see  no  inconsistency  there,  only  a  small  philosophical
confusion. 
53 In  a  perfectly  straightforward  sense,  ‘metaphysics’  and  ‘epistemology’  cannot be
philosophically  separated  from  ‘semantic  analysis,’  or  it  from  them.  Semantics  is
metaphysics by another name (pace Carnap, Quine, Michael Dummett, and an army of
others): we need a test of sorts (however provisional or ad hoc) by which to settle the
pragmatist status of figures like Brandom, Sellars, Frege, Quine, Carnap, Rorty, Putnam,
and  (now)  Price,  and  perhaps  Wittgenstein;  and  the  test  we  need  cannot  apply
disjunctively to human ‘subjects’  and physical ‘objects’  (or to what Price speaks of as
‘subject naturalism’ and ‘object naturalism’) – or to sorting the ‘purely verbal’ function of
‘semantic’ distinctions from those that are (somehow) metaphysically freighted. There’s
the nerve of the emerging agon involving pragmatism and naturalism. The unlikelihood
of vindicating any such disjunction is classic pragmatism’s ace – whatever quarrels may
appear to arise regarding truth, validation, knowledge, meaning, or reality! Abduction (in
Peirce’s best sense) takes a distinctly holist and realist cast that corresponds very neatly
to what Wittgenstein calls ‘a form of life.’
54 I’ll  add a  small  bit  more regarding Paul  Horwich’s  exemplary attempt  to  secure  the
sparest possible (most unyielding) form of deflationism that can be found (what Horwich
calls ‘minimalism’), to assure you that the objection I’ve advanced applies to Horwich’s
thesis as readily as to Price’s and Brandom’s alternatives. The following is the leanest
version of deflationary minimalism that I’m familiar with:
Deflationism begins by emphasizing the fact that no matter what theory of truth we
might espouse professionally, we are all prepared to infer 
The belief that snow is white is true
from
Snow is white
and vice versa. And, more generally, we all accept instances of the ‘truth schemata’
The belief (conjecture, assertion supposition....) that p is true iff p.
But instead of taking the traditional view that an analysis of truth still needs to be
given – a reductive account deeper than the truth schemata, which will explain why
we accept their instances – the deflationist maintains that, since our commitment
to these schemata accounts for everything we do with the truth predicate, we can
suppose that they implicitly define it.31
55 I  take  this  to  be  irreconcilable  with pragmatism,  simply  because  the  use  of  ‘true’  is
inseparable  from  whatever  counts  as  the  outcome  of  successful  inquiries  regarding
worldly things viewed in terms of human interests. Speaking rather unguardedly, the
essential issue is either not the analysis or definition of the ‘truth predicate’ (along the
lines of the ‘truth schemata’ given) or it concerns the relationship between the use of the
truth predicate (in something like the first sense) and the usual accounts of metaphysical
and epistemological questions having to do with what we regard as an actual body of
knowledge  (suitably  validated)  that,  for  that  reason,  counts  as  a  proper  part  of  the
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analysis (of the use) of the predicate ‘true.’ In this sense, though I regret having to say so,
Horwich is finally evasive. 
⁂
56 This concludes the first part of my answer to Putnam’s question. I realize it may appear to
leave us all at loose ends. Well, not completely. Let me mollify you some. What I’ve done
thus far is provide a set of considerations in terms of which Putnam’s question should be
met (and would be met effectively) by staging a confrontation between Brandom and
Wittgenstein  rather  than  by  featuring  a  reminder  of  Rorty’s  extravagant  (and
improbable) readingof Wittgenstein, or a tepid picture of Wittgenstein’s convergence in
the direction of certain of Kant’s concessions. (This is, in fact, the nerve of what is to be
the second part  of  the larger inquiry of  which the first  part  is  now before you:  the
fundamental disagreement between Brandom and Wittgenstein regarding a matter that
supposedly affects the pragmatist standing of each.) The decisive reason, I’ve suggested,
is simply that it is indeed Brandom who has effectively challenged every conventional
form of pragmatism and analytic philosophy to change its orientation along the lines of
what Brandom calls ‘analytic pragmatism.’ Brandom has made an arresting case for a new
constellation of  convergences  involving strenuous  options  drawn especially  from the
different,  sometimes  overlapping  interests  of  naturalism,  deflationism,  and
inferentialism.32
57 That is, I suggest we try to answer Putnam’s question by looking to the most salient topics
of  our  imminent  future.  I  have no doubt  that  the central  agon will  at  least  include,
certainly for a not insignificant season, the pragmatist and analytic critique of Brandom’s
inferentialism. (The second part of this essay centers on what I take to be Brandom’s
profound misreading [or misunderstanding] of Wittgenstein’s ‘meaning’/’use’ distinction,
on  the  strength  of  which  Brandom  claims  to  base  the  pragmatism  of  his  own
undertaking.) Nevertheless, I think it may well be that the general suggestion I’ve been
exploring here is, finally, more important than the specific confrontation I recommend. If
that proved true,  it  would yield a striking,  however distant,  analogue of  the original
stalemate  between  Rorty  and  Putnam (which  went  nowhere  philosophically  and  yet
revitalized the academy’s interest in pragmatism in the most remarkable way). In any
event,  the original  question only seems to elude us as  its  implications become more
evident.
58 According to Putnam, Wittgenstein and the pragmatists converge. I grant the point –and
move on to a greener comparison. I suggest we consider instead the respect in which,
misreading Wittgenstein, Brandom utterly fails to bring his project into accord with the
most  minimal  considerations  essential  to  pragmatism.  The  trouble  is,  the  argument
leading  to  Brandom’s  conclusion  should  accord  with  the  findings  I’ve  now  laid  out
regarding  the  resources  of  naturalism  and  deflationism;  here,  standard  arguments
examined in terms of specimens drawn from Price and Horwich prove to be very difficult
to  make  convincing.  Furthermore,  the  actual  argument  involving  the  comparison
between Brandom and Wittgenstein has proved to be about as long as the preliminary
argument now before you.  In fact,  it  requires its  own stage-setting,  which I  couldn’t
possibly have included here. So I’m obliged to stop and signal (all too briefly) just how the
rest of the argument should play out and what it should entail. I can only hope, therefore,
that you find this part of it intriguing enough to wait to see how its sequel plays out.
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59 Reasonable  cautions  against  the excesses  of  deflationism and those of  scientistically-
minded naturalisms do not need to wait for the second part of the argument. They are
reasonably free-standing and convincingly concluded here; and, of course, they count
straightforwardly in favor of any moderate pragmatism – say, conceptions more or less in
accord with the tally earlier provided. So that if Brandom cannot rely on his reading of
Wittgenstein to buttress the genuinely pragmatist character of his inferentialism, which
in fact relies almost entirely on extending the (already) settled work of algorithmically
regularized inference-forms drawn from the special  vocabularies  of  formal  semantics
(introduced  in  Between  Saying  and  Doing),  then  it  should  become  quite  clear  that
Brandom’s misreading of Wittgenstein (if confirmed) might well signify that he’s made no
use of any sustained analysis (Wittgensteinian or not) of the actual and possible ways in
which inferential linkages in language-games or fragments of ordinary natural-language
discourse are processed and discerned or reasonably imputed.
60 But if so, then I, for one, cannot see the force of claiming that Brandom’s own model of a
‘semantic  logicism’  is  a  full-bodied  form  of  pragmatism.33 It’s  entirely  possible  that
Brandom means little more,  by “pragmatic,” than that,  in pertinent contexts,  we are
entitled to replace the inferentially implicit “content” of what speakers ‘do’ (verbally and
non-verbally)  with  the  appropriately  matched  ‘content’  of  what,  on  Brandom’s  own
argument, we say speakers could then ‘say,’ preserving implicit inferential intentions (or
intended content)  ranging over expressive and behavioral  episodes.  But  strategies  of
these sorts have surely not yet earned the right to claim a privileged approach to the
analysis  of  the ‘logical’  life  of  natural-language discourse!  Yet  that  is  precisely  what
Wittgenstein’s  exercises  (in  Investigations)  put  at  mortal  risk.  That  is  the  key  to  the
tempting suggestion that Wittgenstein may have been a pragmatist after all. (In effect:
distancing himself as far as possible from what, as it turns out, Brandom actually calls
Frege’s ‘pragmatism.’) Furthermore, to have stalemated the extreme uses of deflationism
and naturalism (more strenuously championed by Price than by Brandom) is to deprive
Brandom of the other principal dialectical resources he himself invokes in his attempt to
lay a proper ground for inferentialism. But then, as it turns out, Brandom’s mistake in
pressing  a  deflationist  reading  of  ‘true’  unexpectedly  anticipates  the  import  of  his
misreading of Wittgenstein.
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NOTES
1. See Hilary Putnam, “Was Wittgenstein a Pragmatist?,” (1995: 27).
2. Putnam (1995: xi).
3. Putnam (1995: 27).
4. Richard Rorty (1979: 5, 7).
5. Putnam (1995: 34-6).
6. Rorty (1979: 373). Rorty claims to be an opponent of analytic scientism, but his proclivities
remain  eliminativist,  as  they’ve  been  for  a  very  long  time.  Compare  Hilary  Putnam  (2000),
“Richard Rorty on Reality and Justification”; and Rorty’s “Response to Hilary Putnam,” in the
same volume. Putnam may have made too much of some lines in Richard Rorty,  Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity, (1989: 6-7) (within the whole of the essay, “The Contingency of Language”).
The simple fact is that Rorty is often indifferent to seeming paradox and inconsistency – and,
very possibly, at times, to stubborn inconsistency (for example, his own). 
7. I  provide the details of such a form of realism (among the pragmatists)  in my Pragmatism
Ascendent: A Yard of Narrative, An Ounce of Prophecy, (2012).
8. John McDowell’s “Toward Rehabilitating Objectivity,” (2000), notes that Rorty (1991), approves
of  Putnam’s  having  argued  that  "notions  like  ‘reference’  –  semantical  notions  which  relate
language  to  nonlanguage  –  are  internal  to  our  overall  view  of  the  world";  that  "From  the
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standpoint  of  the  representionalist,  the  fact  that  notions like  representation,  reference,  and
truth are deployed in ways that are internal to a language or a theory is no reason to deny them"
(6; cited at 114 by McDowell). I’d forgotten this nice piece of civility. But I think I may say that,
here, both Rorty and Putnam are clearly pragmatists, but neither was able to hold the line: not
Rorty in what I’ve already cited from The Mirror of Nature, and not Putnam, in his Dewey Lectures,
(1994: 495-517). 
9. I take this to be the ‘conserving,’ the deliberately ‘conservative,’ import of Brandom’s entire
program – opposed, if I may say so, to the radical economies of Rorty’s postmodern pragmatism
and,  as  we shall  see,  to  the very differently  motivated ‘semantic  minimalism’  of  the kind of
naturalism favored by Huw Price, who is otherwise an ally of Brandom’s. Brandom makes it clear
at the very start of his account that his formulation (what he calls ‘semantic logicism’) is meant
to  be  hospitable  to  all  kinds  of  ways  of  treating  ‘semantic  relations  between  vocabularies’
(serving inferentialism’s  program):  “analysis,  definition,  paraphrase,  translation,  reduction of
different sorts, truth-making, and various kinds of supervenience” – where “it is characteristic of
classical analytic philosophy that logical vocabulary is accorded a privileged role in specifying
these semantic relations” (Between Saying and Doing, 2). I make the worry explicit because Rorty
seems  to  be  a  bit  shocked  by  Brandom’s  effort  (which  is  odd)  and  Price  seems  baffled  by
Brandom’s way of proceeding (which might well be puzzling to an extreme deflationist).
10. Brandom (2008: 1).
11. Two short pieces come to mind that have helped me in reviewing these matters. The first is
Brandom’s “Response to John McDowell,” addressed to John McDowell,  “Comment on Lecture
One” (of Between Saying and Doing), one of a series of instructive papers by different hands (and
responses to each by Brandom),  collected in Philosophical  Topics,  36 (2),  2008.  Here,  Brandom
confirms his intent to bring analytic philosophy and pragmatism together in order to launch his
‘analytic  pragmatism’ (135).  But he also explains the sense in which he’s  not wedded to any
particular  ‘paradigmatic  core  program’  (empiricism,  naturalism,  artificial  intelligence,
functionalism,  or  the  like)  (135).  He’s  prepared  to  shift  from  one  to  another,  quite  freely,
wherever any such option proves to be particularly helpful.
The other  piece  is  a  trim Critical  Notice  of  Brandom’s  book:  Daniel  Whiting  (2009).  Whiting
expresses  doubts  about  the  novelty  of  Brandom’s  general  approach:  “Both  its  proximity  to
pragmatism and, especially, its distance from traditional analytic philosophy (as he characterizes
both) seem overstated. VV-sufficiency and -necessity claims [that is, claims involving matched
target  and base  vocabularies]  are  the  traditional  fodder  of  analytic  philosophy (as  Brandom
describes  it)  and  can  be  arrived  at  without  the  apparatus  of  MURs  [that  is,  'meaning-use
relations']”  (606).  Compare the text  of  Ch.  1,  Between Saying  and Doing.  Whiting’s  doubts  also
suggest considering anticipations in (say) Dewey’s Logic and Peirce’s pragmatic ‘maxim’ (in “How
to  Make  Our  Ideas  Clear”).  I  must  thank  my assistant,  Phillip  Honenberger  for  drawing  my
attention to, and making available, these (and related) materials. 
12. Compare Michael Dummett (1981, Introduction). 
13. Brandom (2008: 202).
14. See Huw Price (2011: 308-9).
15. See Price (2011: 186).
16. See Daniel C. Dennett 1991.
17. Price (2011: 137).
18. Price (2011: 136).
19. Price (2011: 147). On the ‘Carnap Thesi,’ see 136-7.
20. Price (2011: 30-2, 185-7).
21. Price (2011: 31). That Price entertains the idea at all is already completely incompatible with
any viable form of pragmatism – hence, on my argument, any defensible form of naturalism. 
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22. See  Price  (2011:  xi,  319-21).  Compare  Robert  B. Brandom  (2011:  140-1).  See,  also,  Simon
Blackburn (1993, Ch. 1), which colors the exchange between Price and Brandom.
23. See  Robert  B.  Brandom  (2009:  163-5).  Brandom  cites  as  the  original  source  of  the  idea,
D. Grover, J. Camp, & N. Belnap (1975), which I have not read.
24. See Robert B. Brandom, “Why Truth is Not Important in Philosophy,” (2009: 159).
25. Brandom (2009: 158); but compare the rest of the chapter.
26. Price (2011: 318); compare Brandom (2008: 177-8).
27. Price (2011: 186).
28. Price (2011: 186).
29. Price (2011: 185-7).
30. Price (2011: 116-7; see, also, 115).
31. Paul Horwich, “The Minimalist Conception of Truth,” slightly revised, abstracted from his
Truth,  2nd. ed.,  Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, in Truth,  S.  Blackburn and K. Simmons
(eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, 240.
32. Regarding the first two themes, see, further, Brandom (2011, Introduction and Ch. 7).
33. See Brandom (2008: 48-54).
ABSTRACTS
The paper notices that different readings have been provided as for the connections between
Wittgenstein and pragmatism, such as for example H. Putnam’s picture as opposed to R. Rorty’s
description that packages Wittgenstein and Dewey together as ‘postmodern’ pragmatists. Joseph
Margolis tries to broaden the discussion by including an examination of Wilfrid Sellars, Gottlob
Frege, Robert Brandom, and Huw Price. His aim it to review the newer challenges of naturalism
and  deflationism,  which,  by  their  own  instruction,  should  bring  us  to  the  decisive  contest
between the ‘pragmatism’ of the Investigations and that of Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing.
The larger purpose of this exercise is to assess pragmatism’s best prospects currently, in meeting
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